As the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the atmosphere in Europe has grown increasingly tense. Border violations or accusations of them now occur almost daily. In this regard, the situation is as dangerous as during the Cold War crises. It was only worse during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After the missile crisis in autumn 1962, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union realised how close they had come to a full-scale nuclear war. This gradually led to a period of arms control negotiations and détente, culminating in the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.
The CSCE security basket included several confidence- and security-building measures. Their purpose was to alleviate suspicions about the other party’s intentions and to eliminate the risk, or at least significantly reduce, the risk that incidents would escalate into war. The basic idea is that military action must be made transparent to the other party. All essential matters, such as military exercises and troop movements, must be communicated in advance.
We are now in a situation where urgent discussions and negotiations are needed for new confidence-building and security measures. Previously established rules have broken down, and communication channels are almost entirely closed – there is virtually no constructive dialogue, except for some low-level technical contacts. For this reason, it is all too easy to see almost any event as a provocation and a sign of the adversary’s malicious intent.
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) launched a dialogue process focused on the North region three years ago, in September 2022, about six months after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. The process addresses security, governance, and cooperation on scientific and environmental matters in the Arctic.
This is a so-called “track two” diplomacy involving former soldiers and diplomats, as well as representatives of current security organisations acting as private individuals, researchers, and members of civil society (represented in this process, for example, by the International Inuit Council).
After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, seven of the eight countries in the region are now NATO members. However, geographically, a massive part of the North belongs to Russia. The process initiated by the GCSP is therefore centred on the relations between Russia and the West.
I was invited to join the security group of the “High North Talks” process in the winter of 2024, attending my first meeting in Geneva (or more precisely in Montreaux) in March of the same year.
On Monday of this week (22 September 2025), we finalised the security concept paper. On Tuesday, we presented the paper to a broader group, which included permanent representatives of a few key countries in Geneva (Geneva is home to many other international organisations in addition to the UN). Such activities can be described as level 1.5 diplomacy, whereas in level 1 diplomacy, the negotiators are official representatives of states and possibly international organisations.
The concept paper presents some recommendations for security and confidence-building measures. The basic idea is similar to the OSCE, but the circumstances have changed in many ways. Current recommendations also include the use of automatic identification devices and refraining from interfering with navigational systems in the territory of other states, as well as non-interference in commercial shipping in international waters. The recommendations include references to various agreements and their regulations, as well as proposals for organising meetings and opening a new communication channel.
Northern cooperation would indeed be necessary for many reasons other than security. For example, the Arctic region is of utmost importance in terms of global warming, and scientific and other forms of cooperation would now be vital not only for the northern states but also for the entire world. The Arctic region also has many natural resources, and interest in them creates new problems and (in the absence of cooperation) conflicts.
It is evident also from the discussions in Geneva that cooperation in the North region is unlikely to develop significantly until the peace process in Ukraine begins. Donald Trump’s abrupt shift in his UN speech and Russia’s response to it would only seem to hasten the war further. Security and confidence-building measures would be crucial in these circumstances, but their adoption currently appears unlikely.
However, the significance of the Geneva “High North Talks” process lies in the fact that when the window of opportunity opens, concepts and proposals are ready that can be quickly adopted, perhaps unilaterally, and discussed multilaterally.
