The concept of security dilemma is central to understanding the conflict between the West and Russia. This understanding helps explain how states’ efforts to strengthen their own security may paradoxically increase uncertainty and tensions in relations between states and their alliances. This blog was first published at Brave New Europe.
In the current situation, the media and political discourse favour clear, morally black-and-white narratives – and this applies to both the West and Russia. In contrast, the concept of security dilemma requires a cold, calm, and impartial analysis.
The basic idea of the security dilemma is simple. Our security depends on what others do. The real insight is that we ourselves are others to those on whose actions our security depends. For each “self” it is true that there can never be complete certainty about the intentions of others. There is interdependence: the security situation of each self (ego) depends on what the other (alter) does.
Uncertainty concerns not only the future but also the past. Even when things have already happened and the outcome is known, historians continue to argue about who intended what and to what extent each actor was responsible or guilty for what happened. Although the past has inevitably happened in a certain way and what has occurred cannot be changed, interpretations of the past are uncertain and political – political because the interpretations of history have an impact on the organisation of the present and the future.
John Herz first introduced the concept of security dilemma in his 1950 article in the journal World Politics. At the same time, a similar concept was developed by the British historian Herbert Butterfield. Since then, the term has become established in international relations textbooks as a basic concept. Perhaps the most thorough presentation of the subject is Ken Booth and Nick Wheeler’s book The Security Dilemma (2008), to which John Herz managed to write a foreword just before his death at the age of 97.
There are different variations of the concept, many of which depend on philosophical assumptions. For example, there are theories about human nature or concerning uncertainty about the existence of other minds in general.
It makes more sense to see the security dilemma as context- and history-bound, as Booth and Wheeler do. Fear, uncertainty, and trust can develop in different contexts in many directions in a path-dependent manner. At one extreme, uncertainty can disappear or become irrelevant, because there is no longer a need to prepare for the use of collective violence against the other. At the other extreme, there is a (possibly reciprocal) belief that there is no doubt about the aggressive intentions of the other.
The security paradox
The core of the problem is that the security dilemma easily leads to a security paradox. Fear and uncertainty about the intentions of the other produce a spiral of reciprocal actions, where the end result is that everyone’s insecurity increases. The problem is reinforced by the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive weapons or security arrangements. Typically, the result of such a cycle is a situation in which each side is convinced about the aggressive intentions of the other. How else could one understand the actions of the other?
What if the other side really is Hitler? It is no wonder that a significant part of the discussion about the concept has been related to interpretations of Nazi Germany. As Hitler made clear in his book Mein Kampf, Germany’s goal was domination of the eastern part of Europe and the western part of Russia (“Lebensraum”). The war against Britain and France may have been an unintended consequence of the conquest of Poland, but it seems clear that the readiness of Hitler and the Nazi regime to start a large-scale war was not based solely on a security dilemma.
Yet Munich 1938 is the most misused analogy: it has justified numerous subsequent wars from the Korean War to the Iraqi War. In the context of the Ukrainian war, the core of the security paradox is that both Russia and the West use historical analogies and often compare the current situation with the events of the 1930s and 1940s, thereby implying that there is no doubt about the aggressiveness of the other side.
How do one’s actions appear to others?
Russia sees the expansion of the West and NATO to its borders in the light of its historical experiences. The greatest threat has come from the West. Operation Barbarossa – the invasion that started in the summer of 1941 – was an even more traumatic experience than Napoleon’s invasion. Now in Russia, it is perceived that Ukraine is ruled by people with neo-Nazi ties while there is great uncertainty about the intentions of the expanding West.
In the West, the situation is seen more as an analogy to Munich in 1938, where Hitler was given Czechoslovakia and an implicit mandate for further expansion. Attempts to negotiate Ukraine’s military non-alignment – not to mention territorial annexations based on military coercion – are seen as an attempt to build a sphere of influence for Russia and subjugate neighbouring nations to Moscow’s rule.
Sometimes the interpretations can be a bit more nuanced and yet they prevent the situation from being seen as a security dilemma. For example, many Western experts believe that Russian policy has ideological and revisionist goals (such as the partial restoration of the Soviet sphere of influence) and that it is not a mere defensive reaction to Western actions. Such an interpretation can find some support, for example, from the “Russki mir” ideology, which states that Russia has the right or even the obligation to “protect” Russians regardless of their country of residence.
Similarly in Russia, it can be thought that although the West does not have – and has not had – clear intentions to attack Russia, the West has nevertheless consciously and systematically threatened Russia’s security, for example by expanding NATO and supporting “colour revolutions”. Both aims seem evident in the words and deeds of Western leaders.
The essential question from the perspective of the concept of a security dilemma concerns whether actors can see at all how their own words and deeds look in the eyes of others. What does the invasion of Ukraine look like; or what do American missile defence systems in Eastern Europe or military bases on the NATO-Finland’s borders with Russia look like?
Some theorists have argued that understanding the other is impossible on a principled level, but such an argument is self-defeating, as the very existence of the concept suggests something completely different.
The concept of security dilemma could not have arisen without researchers and other actors who see things from the perspective of the whole. The concept of security dilemma is also applicable to situations where the situation is not completely symmetrical. Moreover, critical researchers cannot eliminate uncertainty about the intentions of others, especially when fear, uncertainty, and real or imagined lessons from history can justify those intentions. Intentions change with the processes, and the expansion of conflicts can lead to increasingly harsh interpretations and demands.
The counterpart to security dilemma is security community
The value of the concept lies in the critical potential it contains to either alleviate and resolve conflict or even completely transcend it over time. The counterpart of the concept of security dilemma is the security community. The concept of a security community was developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in 1957. In a pluralistic security community, there may be separate states, and yet they do not prepare to defend themselves against a possible attack by another. In a security community, there is an institutionally established expectation that conflicts can be resolved through peaceful changes.
The security dilemma only prevails in some situations and contexts. Contexts change and can also be changed purposefully, although that can be very difficult – as is already indicated by how tricky it seems to be to apply the concept of a security dilemma in the current situation.
The adoption of the concept of a security dilemma is often difficult among the parties because the concept is not compatible with the prevailing political narratives. Attempts at changing the dominant stories can be arduous, risky or even dangerous because these stories are anchored in prevailing identities, interests and power mechanisms.
However, no social relationship is predetermined. In an era of global existential risks, ensuring the future of humanity depends on our ability to build trust and cooperate.
Heikki Patomäki
