The attack on Venezuela: the return of spheres of interests and imperialism, or towards a post-hegemonic world system?

January 4, 2026

The oil tanker hijackings, the US invasion of Venezuela, and the kidnapping of Maduro violate many laws. These include the UN Charter, the law of the sea (especially UNCLOS), and the 1988 Convention on Drug Trafficking. The attack is also problematic for the US’s own political and legal system. The Trump administration acted without congressional authorisation and ignored other legal considerations. In this blog, I consider to what extent the attack only deepens the ongoing retrogression towards traditional imperialism, and to what extent it is more a matter of the old dying at the time when the new cannot yet be born. Many pathological symptoms are evident in such an in-between state. [This text was first published by Brave New Europe on 4.1.2025]

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Towards confidence- and security-building measures?

September 25, 2025

As the Russo-Ukrainian war persists, the atmosphere in Europe has grown increasingly tense. Border violations or accusations of them now occur almost daily. In this regard, the situation is as dangerous as during the Cold War crises. It was only worse during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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The temporal logic of Trump II’s climate denialism

August 18, 2025

In a landmark advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on 23 July 2025 that all UN member states have legal obligations under international law to address climate change, which the court described as an existential threat to life on Earth. Powerful countries too must be held responsible for their current emissions and past inaction. [This text was first published in the World & New World Journal (WNWJ) on 18 August 2025.]

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Military expenditure, the economy, and security paradox: what NATO’s defence spending spree means for Finland and the world

June 28, 2025

NATO has decided on a huge increase in defence spending: member countries are expected to spend 5% of their GDP on defence, 3.5% directly on armed forces and 1.5% on some broader security spending. For Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, this new policy comes at a time of no or slow economic growth, public spending cuts and with severed relations with Russia. [This version of the text was first published by Brave New Europe on 27 June 2025.]

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