NATO has decided on a huge increase in defence spending: member countries are expected to spend 5% of their GDP on defence, 3.5% directly on armed forces and 1.5% on some broader security spending. For Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, this new policy comes at a time of no or slow economic growth, public spending cuts and with severed relations with Russia. [This version of the text was first published by Brave New Europe on 27 June 2025.]
While security has understandably become a concern following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this does not justify a security build-up of the current kind, where vague appeals to existential fear seem sufficient to justify exceptional procedures, the bypassing of democratic processes, and large-scale militarisation.
How exactly is NATO’s decision justified? Does the justification stand up to critical scrutiny? What does such a huge defence emphasis mean from the point of view of democratic decision-making, the Finnish economy and security policy?
We must also be able to look at things from a broader perspective, i.e. what are the implications of such a decision in Europe and globally? What will be the effects?
Democracy and public debate
In Finland, foreign and security policy has traditionally been made through parliamentary consensus, open debate and expert advice. However, decisions relating to NATO membership – both accession itself and the proposed expansion of the defence budget – have been taken with unprecedented speed and little real public debate.
Since the 1990s, many security researchers have warned that securitisation tends to override normal democratic procedures and generate policies that cannot be criticised without the risk of being branded irresponsible. As securitisation becomes institutionalised, democracy narrows and erodes, and public debate becomes one-sided and increasingly exclusionary. This is the path of authoritarianisation and, ultimately, autocratisation.
One of the most striking features of the current direction of NATO is indeed the lack of open and democratic debate. Firstly, everyone seems to have accepted the first arbitrary ‘offer’ of the deal-maker Donald Trump without even properly negotiating it (the only ‘counter-offer’ has been the invention of the equation 3.5% + 1.5%). Secondly, decisions of this magnitude – involving trillions of dollars of future expenditure – have been taken quickly and mostly behind closed doors, with hardly any parliamentary scrutiny or genuine public debate.
This technocratic approach may satisfy the internal logic of the alliance, but at the same time, it undermines the democratic legitimacy of security policy. The effect is similar to that of transnational neo-constitutionalism in general: taking matters out of the democratic decision-making process through international agreements.[i]
For the first time, Finland is now a fully integrated part of the Euro-Atlantic defence system, whose operating logic is based on deterrence and retaliation. This means that decisions are increasingly taken on the terms taken as given, whether understood in terms of necessity or set by others, rather than autonomously. At an earlier stage in history, such orientation was called pejoratively “Finlandisation”, although the Cold War path of neutrality required much more autonomous thinking and action than the current NATO path.
Increased defence spending versus sustainable growth and social development
Compared to the levels from the early 1980s to 2010, Finland has by now doubled its defence budget. Currently, around 2.3% of GDP is spent on arms and the army, which is already above the previous NATO target of 2%.
Rising to the new 5% target level would mean an additional expenditure of around €8 billion per year (calculated on the basis of the current GDP). By comparison, the Ministry of Education and Culture has a budget of around €8 billion in 2025.
As we know, the Finnish economy is struggling with a wide range of problems. These include low investment and slow growth, which are still being exacerbated by the prevailing austerity policies. In turn, poor economic performance is exacerbating the debt problem, which is being used to justify further cuts.[ii]
Even if Finland were to get a government with somewhat more sensible economic policies, the constraints of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact impose strict conditions on borrowing, which in practice means cuts in public services or tax increases.
This opens up a classic ‘guns or bread’ dilemma: should state resources be spent on security or welfare and social development? If the starting point is – as it has almost always been since the 1990s – no increase in permanent public spending, then an increase in defence spending means cuts of €8 billion from other ministries.
Strategic wisdom or an escalation trap?
Existential fear is effectively fear of Russia, but how explicit and well-founded are the threat scenarios? Commentators widely share the view that there is no credible evidence of an imminent Russian attack on NATO territory.
To the extent that there is any declared credible threat scenario, it concerns the longer-term risk that further Russian rearmament will encourage Russia to test NATO’s resolve. Russia could, in the future, at least in some circumstances (perhaps related to the repression of Russian-speaking minorities), target selected and vulnerable areas on the front line.
Even assuming that the Russian leadership has a reason to do so (no intelligence now suggests any intention to attack)[iii], the British Armed Forces Commander Tony Radak, for example, has stated that in the event of war, NATO would overwhelmingly prevail over Russia. NATO has a “phenomenal overmatch” over Russia, with a 3-4 times stronger air force and navy and perhaps 20 times bigger defence budget. Even if the US is excluded from the equation, there is a significant asymmetry between the parties.[iv]
European NATO countries are stronger than Russia economically (7 x Russia’s GDP) and demographically (even if Turkey is excluded, almost 4 x Russia’s population). Europe benefits from strategic depth, multiple borders and internal lines of manoeuvre – unlike Russia, which has to spread its forces thinly over a wide border (in total, Russia has more than 20,000 km of borders). European forces tend to have more modern weapon systems, while Russia still relies in significant part on old Soviet-era equipment. The war in Ukraine has exposed weaknesses on the European side, but the same applies to Russia.
The problem is not only panic and exaggeration of threats, but also the fact that the parties to the conflict do not see what their decisions and actions are causing. The new round of NATO-led armament exposes Finland increasingly deeply to the logic of the security dilemma: when one side arms to defend itself, the other perceives it as a threat and arms more – the end result is a spiral that increases the likelihood of war, not reduces it. This is also known as the security paradox: the drive for greater security ultimately leads to greater insecurity.[v]
The warnings of history are obvious. The arms race model, first developed by Lewis Fry Richardson, an English mathematician, physicist, meteorologist, and psychologist, shows how fear-based armament can lead to a major war, as happened in 1914, for example.[vi]
Russia and China have already commented on NATO’s decision to increase the number of weapons very significantly. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov describes NATO as “confrontational in nature”. Russia is being demonised, while Russia is only responding to NATO provocations, which include NATO’s attempt to expand into Russia’s borders.[vii] Russia’s response includes missile development and the build-up of weapons.
Of course, the Russian leadership is as blind as the NATO leadership to what their own actions look like to their adversaries and what counter-reactions they provoke, but it is precisely this mutual blindness that lies at the heart of the security dilemma. Parties operate on the assumption that they are reacting to the other’s expansionist ambitions, provocations and threats, and the result is a process leading to a security paradox and possibly war.
Initial reactions in China have been cautious and restrained. In China, pundits consider the 5% target unrealistic, while stressing that the arms build-up is not directed against China.
However, China Military Online has warned that NATO’s agenda will exacerbate global confrontation and risk an arms race. China sees NATO’s expansion and arms build-up as part of a wider militarised world order, not necessarily as an immediate threat but as a sign of growing strategic competition.[viii]
Chinese commentators have also pointed out that such militarisation has wider implications, forcing Europe to cut public investment and social spending and reducing Europe’s ability to contribute to global climate action, poverty reduction, and global governance.
Conclusion: Security is not primarily about weapons
NATO’s decision is driven not only by negative European and global security dynamics but also by specific interests that are driving processes in the same direction. Both public and private arms industries have vested interests and lobbying power.
Moreover, the US is the world’s largest arms exporter. “America first” Trump wants Europeans not only to pay more but also to buy American weapons. Such interests contribute to shaping NATO’s strategic priorities.
NATO’s decision to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP reflects outdated assumptions about what security is in the 21st century. In post-Cold War Finland, politicians and pundits used to emphasise that security is not primarily about weapons or alliances, but rather about trust, justice and inclusion. The OSCE was based on the concept of common security. Such notions defined the future of security and peace, but then things took a retrogressive turn.[ix]
Military spending has, among other things, regressive income distribution effects, as it produces less inclusive or income-distributive benefits compared to public investment or welfare services. This suggests that the decision is likely to exacerbate social inequalities and political fragmentation, especially in the already economically troubled peripheral economies of the EU. This does not bode well for the future of the EU.
A return to old-fashioned militarism also ignores decades of scientific research on arms races, security dilemmas, and security paradoxes. When the OSCE was established at the end of the Cold War, the lessons of previous history had taught us that the direction must be towards common security, i.e. towards confidence-building, disarmament, and the building of common institutions. Now NATO has fallen into the very trap that the OSCE and the UN before it were built to avoid: undermining security by investing in instruments of warfare.
The big global issues of the 21st century concern the world economy, climate, ecosystems, and (potentially runaway) technological developments. A return to pre-World War I great power neo-imperialism, alliance politics, and arms build-up increases the likelihood of massive military disaster and makes it more difficult to solve common problems.
END NOTES
[i] This concept, developed by Stephen Gill, refers to a form of global constitutionalism that codifies neoliberal economic principles into binding legal and institutional frameworks, particularly at the transnational and supranational levels. It reflects an effort to lock in certain market-oriented policies and limit democratic contestation or alternative policy paths. Although it has not often been used in security contexts, it applies well to the NATO decision made in The Hague on 24-25 June, 2025, as the decision to invest 5% of GDP in defence constrains national governments’ ability to pursue public investments on productive purposes or social justice policies. See Gill, Stephen (2002) Power and Resistance in the New World Order, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
[ii] The current government, led by the Conservatives and the Finns party, has instigated a new and drastic round of austerity in Finland. Under the prevailing circumstances, this has harmed the GDP and employment through the basic Keynesian multiplier effect. The multiplier effect means that aggregate demand and thus also labour demand fall way below the potential. This implies a tendency for tax revenues to decrease and unemployment costs and social spending to rise, thus putting more pressure on public budgets, leading to more deficit and debt. To the extent that the cuts target social and health spending, other public services or mean layoffs, they increase poverty, inequality and unemployment. On the other hand, whenever the cuts target education, for example, the result is the erosion of the most important resource for Finland’s future. To the best of my knowledge, all critical studies, reports and blogs (including mine) regarding these processes that have been published are in Finnish. A good recent example is the UTAK (The Centre for New Economic Thinking) 2025 report available at https://utak.fi/selvitys-orpon-hallituksen-sopeutustoimet-kasvattavat-suomen-julkista-velkasuhdetta/.
[iii] See, for example, “Would Vladimir Putin attack NATO? Russia is building up its forces, causing fear in its neighbours”, The Economist, 8 May 2025. The Economist is very critical of Russia and the Putin regime, yet writes: “There is no specific intelligence at present that suggests Russia intends to attack NATO.” At https://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/05/08/would-vladimir-putin-attack-nato.
[iv] “NATO ‘phenomenal overmatch’ over Russia says forces chief”, ukdj (The UK Defence Journal) June 12, 2025, at https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-phenomenal-overmatch-over-russia-says-forces-chief/.
[v] See my blog “Security dilemma”, February 12, 2025, at https://braveneweurope.com/heikki-patomaki-security-dilemma.
[vi] See e.g. Paul F. Diehl (2021) “What Richardson Got Right (and Wrong) About Arms Races and War”, in N.P.Gleditsch (ed.) Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Sciences, Cham: Springer, pp.35-44.
[vii] “Russia says NATO needs to demonise it to justify 5% defence spending target”, Reuters, June 24, 2025, at https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-says-nato-needs-demonise-it-justify-5-defence-spending-target-2025-06-24/.
[viii] “NATO’s 5% defence spending may pose greater global threat”, China Military Online, June 13, 2025, at http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/OPINIONS_209196/Opinions_209197/16391090.html.
[ix] I first systematically analysed the neo-imperial retrogressive turn that occurred in the early 2000s (involving the “war on terror” and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq) and its likely consequences in my 2008 book The Political Economy of Global Security. War, Future Crises, and Changes in Global Governance, London: Routledge. Subsequently, I began to see the global financial crisis of 2008-9 as another significant turning point; see my 2018 book Disintegrative Tendencies in Global Political Economy: Exits and Conflicts, Abingdon: Routledge (open access: https://www.routledge.com/Disintegrative-Tendencies-in-Global-Political-Economy-Exits-and-Conflicts/Patomaki/p/book/9780367357573).
